Arya News - Singapore`s separation from Malaysia was a "bloodless coup" orchestrated by Dr Goh Keng Swee and Tun Abdul Razak in 25 days, detailed in a new book, "The Albatross File."
SINGAPORE – Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in August 1965 was the result of a “bloodless coup” orchestrated by then Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee and then Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, over just 25 days.
A new book, The Albatross File: Inside Separation, shows how an off-the-cuff remark by Dr Goh on July 15, 1965, set off a chain of moves that led to the proclamation, at 10am on Aug 9, that “Singapore shall be forever a sovereign democratic and independent nation”.
The book, edited by Ms Susan Sim and published by The Straits Times Press and the National Archives of Singapore, drew on papers that Dr Goh kept in a file he code-named “Albatross”, alongside extensive oral history interviews with Singapore’s founding leaders.
Albatross, which contained Cabinet papers, memorandums and Dr Goh’s handwritten notes of his discussions with Malaysian leaders in the months before separation, had until now largely been kept classified. A subset of the documents were exhibited in 2015 to commemorate the Republic’s 50th year of independence.
Dr Goh had considered Malaysia an “albatross round our necks” because the promise of shared prosperity and partnership through merger had quickly given way to fraught debates over race and clashing ideas about the country’s future.
These tensions hardened following two major communal riots in 1964, which exposed how fragile the new federation was.
The book was launched by Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong on Dec 7, alongside a new permanent exhibition at the National Library Building. Here are four of its key revelations:
Off-the-cuff trigger
Following the race riots in July and September 1964, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew concluded that extremist elements in Malaysia could use communal politics and riots as a weapon in Singapore, and that the island had to seek a rearrangement with Kuala Lumpur.
Talks between Mr Lee, Dr Goh and Malaysia’s top leaders – including then Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Razak – were held, and they swung between proposals for cooperation and constitutional rearrangements.
As the Tunku began signalling that he wanted to “hive off” Singapore, quarrels over parliamentary seats, tax revenues, internal security and the PAP’s role in federal politics repeatedly derailed any deal.
The British, which were defending Malaysia against Indonesia’s Konfrontasi, also worked to stymie any constitutional rearrangements within Malaysia.
Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Minister for Digital Development and Information Josephine Teo viewing an exhibit at the launch of the Albatross File book and exhibition at the National Library in Victoria Street on Dec 7. PHOTO: LIANHE ZAOBAO/THE STRAITS TIMES
The PAP then launched a counter-offensive to bring political pressure to bear on Kuala Lumpur, so that Singapore could get good terms from the federal government.
This included reaching out for a united front with all non-communal parties in Sabah, Sarawak and Malaya, which resulted in the Malaysian Solidarity Convention.
By May 1965, diplomatic cables to London were warning that Mr Lee could be arrested. This prompted the British to make clear that they would reassess support for Malaysia in that event, and that such a move would also result in international repercussions.
By June, the Tunku decided it was better to let Singapore go, and in a July 1 letter told Tun Razak they may “have no choice but to cut out Singapore from Malaysia in order to save the rest of the body from gangrene”.
The turning point came on July 15, 1965.
Dr Goh, who was summoned to Tun Razak’s home in Kuala Lumpur, was asked for ideas to tackle the strained relationship. He said the best thing would be to call it quits, and that both sides should go their separate ways.
Tun Razak then asked what he meant by going their separate ways.
Dr Goh said: “Well, we leave Malaysia, become an independent state, and you’ll be relieved of all these troubles, and we would have also been relieved of troubles from you. All these tensions that built up, communal tensions, will all be over. We’re on our own, you’re on your own.”
Tun Razak asked Dr Goh to sound out Mr Lee.
On July 20, in a follow-up meeting with Tun Razak and Malaysian Home Affairs Minister Ismail Abdul Rahman, Dr Goh confirmed that Mr Lee would accept secession if it was done swiftly, quietly and without leaks to the British or the public.
The two sides agreed on an Aug 9 deadline, which was when the federal Parliament reconvened.
To maintain absolute secrecy, they entrusted then Law Minister E.W. Barker to draft the legal instruments that would dismantle the federation for Singapore while preserving vital interests such as water and defence ties.
Mr Barker produced three key texts: an Agreement to Separate, amendments to the Malaysian Constitution – which allowed states to join but not leave – and a Proclamation of Independence for Singapore.
No to looser rearrangement
One of the most striking revelations in the book was that Dr Goh never proposed a looser federation or confederation to Tun Razak. This was even as Mr Lee considered this as a way to reduce friction without a complete break.
In his memoirs, The Singapore Story, Mr Lee said he realised this only in 1994, when he read Dr Goh’s oral history interview – recorded between 1980 and 1982 – and discovered that Dr Goh “never pressed Razak for a looser rearrangement as I had asked him to”.
Instead, Dr Goh had gone “along with their (the Malaysians’) desire to have us hived off”.
In his oral history interview, Dr Goh said he was unsure at the time whether Mr Lee would go along with Separation, but that he had “had enough of Malaysia”.
“I just wanted to get out. I could see no future in it, that the political cost was dreadful and the economic benefits, well, didn’t exist. So it was an exercise in futility.”
“So (as) far as I’m concerned, you know, it’s a project that should be abandoned once you see that it’s worthless,” he added.
“Taking into account that Malay leaders were (also) quite fed up with it and were seeking some relief from pain which they found unbearable, this looked to me as something which they would have accepted.”
Dr Goh said that even if the Singaporean leaders had not proposed Separation, the Tunku would eventually have done so. But the Malaysian Prime Minister might have done it in a way that the British “would have smelt a rat… and then would have put a stop to it”.
Before meeting Tun Razak again on July 26, 1965, Dr Goh asked Mr Lee for a written authorisation to continue the discussions, in case the Malaysian leader wanted proof of Mr Lee’s agreement to secession.
But Dr Goh also had another more tactical reason for obtaining this letter: He wanted Mr Lee to commit himself to Separation.
“For both these reasons, I felt it prudent to have this written undertaking,” he said.
Throughout the negotiations, Dr Goh was decisive and refused to be baited into considering any other option. Every time Tun Razak wavered, he reminded him of all the pain that Mr Lee and the PAP could cause if they remained in Malaysia.
SM Lee Hsien Loong greeting Mr Ong Pang Boon, one of the 10 ministers who signed the Separation Agreement, at the launch of The Albatross File: Inside Separation book and exhibition. PHOTO: THE STRAITS TIMES
Negotiated by the lieutenants
While Mr Lee and the Tunku were the final decision-makers, both the negotiation and signing of the Separation Agreement were first carried out by Dr Goh and Tun Razak before the two prime ministers came into the picture on Aug 7.
Events following Merger, such as the two race riots in Singapore in 1964, had led to mutual suspicion between leaders in Kuala Lumpur and Mr Lee, which added to the instinctive distrust that the Central Government had of a non-communally-aligned PAP.
In his oral history interview, Mr Lee noted that on the negotiations, “the Tunku did not speak to me, I did not speak to him”.
“He got Razak to speak to Goh, and it was settled between them,” he said.
Fortunately, Dr Goh and Tun Razak were friendly, having known each other when they were both students in London. In 1949, both men had co-founded the Malayan Forum, a political discussion group for university students to discuss independence for British Malaya.
Following the July 21, 1964, race riots, Dr Goh proposed going to Kuala Lumpur, and Tun Razak invited him to stay at his home for several days. The two men had a meeting on July 28.
Mr Barker also knew Tun Razak and then Malaysian Attorney-General Abdul Kadir Yusof from their days studying in Raffles College before World War II.
On Aug 6, Dr Goh, Mr Barker and senior Malaysian leaders waited at Tun Razak’s house while the Separation documents were being prepared. They eventually signed the documents in the wee hours of Aug 7.
But Tun Razak had a nagging concern, and confided in Mr Barker: “Eddie, as an old friend, can you assure me that Harry will sign?”
Mr Barker replied: “Of course, he will sign. I assure you that he will sign.”
Last-ditch attempt at confederation
On Aug 7, after the Separation Agreement was already signed by the negotiating ministers at Tun Razak’s home, Mr Lee drove to the Tunku’s residency at noon to explore whether some “looser” form of association might be acceptable.
Mr Lee felt that if the Tunku was agreeable, the two sides could go through with Separation and immediately bring about a confederation, with a joint council for defence and external affairs. This could be done by adding a few paragraphs to the documents, Mr Lee said in his oral history.
“I put it to him, ‘Look, we have spent years to bring about Malaysia. The best part of my adult life was to work towards Malaysia… Do you really want to break it up?’” recalled Mr Lee. “Don’t you think it’s wiser to go back to our original plan, which the British stopped?”
But the Tunku replied: “No, I’m past that. There is no other way now. I’ve made up my mind. You go your own way, we go our own way. We can be friends again.”
The finality conveyed by the Tunku was so conclusive that Mr Lee dropped the matter altogether.
On Aug 8, Mr Lee and the Tunku met again to sign a document Mr Lee had prepared, summarising the points they had agreed. They also confirmed various matters, including the handling of the parliamentary timetable for Separation, and rapid deployment of multiracial troops to the island should trouble flare in Singapore.
Mr Lee then flew home to secure the remaining signatures from his Cabinet.
On the morning of Aug 9, 1965, Singapore’s independence was proclaimed over radio, completing a process that had begun, less than a month earlier, as a suggestion by Dr Goh in Tun Razak’s living room.
Mr Lee said: “We did something quite remarkable – a constitutional coup right under the noses of the British, the Australians and New Zealanders who were defending Malaysia with their blood and treasure.
“I did not want to do it. The Tunku forced us into a position where we either acquiesced in his policies, or we took a stand. We took a stand.”
Read More:
Singapore’s independence was not inevitable; key leaders on both sides pushed for Separation: SM Lee
25 days to a ‘bloodless coup’: The most complete account yet of Singapore’s independence in The Albatross File